argued that the auction which the EPA used in order to start the market for sulfur allowances may reduce the efficiency of the market since it gives sellers an incentive to understate their valuation. In this paper we show that the sellers' incentives are even more perverse than Cason suggested when we take into account that sellers can also submit a bid. We show that sellers have an incentive to set their asking price equal to 0 while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid. ᮊ
INTRODUCTION w x
Since Dales 4 , economists have recommended tradeable permits as an efficient instrument of environmental policy. However, the development of this instrument in policy practice has been slow. In the 1970s emissions trading rules emerged in the U.S. Because there was no conscious design, the rules were unclear and Ž w x. controversial and required a lot of government intervention Liroff 11 . In 1990, the first large-scale, consciously designed emission trading scheme was introduced in the U.S. It was applied to the SO emissions of electric utilities. 1 In 2 Ž . Phase I 1995᎐2000 a limited number of electric utilities participated in the Ž . scheme. In Phase II from 2000 on all electric utilities participate.
Sulfur allowances can be traded in two different ways. One way is to trade privately between utilities, possibly with the intermediation of a broker. By now, the lion's share of allowances is traded in this way. The other trading option is the annual auction in March, organized by the EPA. This auction was first held in Ž . 1993. At the auction the EPA sells the small part 2.8% of the total amount of 1 w x w x Ellerman et al. 6 provide a comprehensive report of the whole program. Schmalensee et al. 13 w x w x summarize the report. Joskow et al. 8 discuss the allowance market. Stavins 14 discusses the positive and normative lessons from the program.
allowances that is not grandfathered directly to the utilities. The revenues of the auction are distributed among the allowance holders. Electric utilities and other interested parties can not only bid at the auction but also offer allowances for sale.
The way in which the auction is conducted is unique. 2 The bids are ranked from high to low. The allowances from the EPA are sold to the highest bidders. The other suppliers are ranked according to their asking price, from low to high. The lowest asker is matched to the highest remaining bidder, etc., as long as the asking price is below the bid price. A successful bidder pays his bid price to the seller to whom he is matched.
This was the first time that this auction design had been implemented. Also, it w x had not been analyzed before. Cason 1 is the only paper which provides an analysis of the auction. 3 The author claims that the market-clearing prices are too low and not all gains from trade are exhausted. The EPA's rules can therefore generate significantly biased price signals and reduce the efficiency of the allowance trading market. 4 In a standard uniform price auction, all trades take place at the market-clearing price, given all bidding and asking prices submitted. In such an auction buyers have an incentive to bid slightly lower than their valuation, whereas sellers have an incentive to ask a price that is slightly higher than their Ž w x w x. valuation see for example Vickrey 15 or McAfee and McMillan 12 . In the EPA auction, however, Cason shows that a seller has an incentive to offer units at prices below her costs. Given that she will sell, the lower her asking price the higher the bid to which she will be matched and therefore the higher her expected revenue. Given that bidders still have an incentive to bid below their valuations, this results in downward-biased price signals which may reduce the efficiency of the market.
Naturally, for the purposes of his paper Cason uses a model that is a highly simplified representation of the actual EPA auction. He assumes that buyers and sellers have demand, resp. supply, of only unit of the good. Recent research suggests that in multiunit auctions it is very hard to achieve efficient outcomes, Ž w x. even if the auction is properly designed see Klemperer 10 . Also, Cason assumes that the distribution of bids is given, and he does not take the interaction between w x the auction and the secondary market into account. Joskow et al. 8, pp. 12᎐13 argue that auction prices can only depart systematically from competitive market prices if the nonauction part of the market is seriously imperfect. Also, they argue that the presence of a private market leads to overstatement, not understatement, w x of reservation prices. Joskow et al. 8 criticize Cason's assumption of private values.
This paper analyzes a less obvious extension of Cason's analysis. We allow for the possibility that sellers can also submit bids at the auction. We show that if that is the case then the equilibrium derived in Cason is no longer a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Specifically, sellers can improve upon that equilibrium by submitting an asking price of 0 while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a bid equal to their valuation. This possibility is unique to this particular auction design. Therefore, we believe that it is a useful extension of Cason's analysis and a further addition to his point. We show that the sellers' incentives in this particular auction 2 This way of conducting the auction is not explicitly laid down in the 1990 Clean Air Act Ž . Ž w x. Amendments CAAA . Rather, it is based upon the EPA's interpretation of the CAAA Cason 1 . design are even more perverse than Cason suggested. We believe our analysis does not modify any of Cason's assumptions. Cason does not explicitly assume that sellers cannot submit a bid. It seems that he merely overlooked this option, as has everyone else analyzing this market or being active in it. 5 We now know that the auction did not live up to its expectations. Why should we then want to analyze this auction, now that it has proven to be a less relevant trading option, at least for private supply? First, there is the intellectual challenge of trying to find an equilibrium to this auction. Second, with a better understanding of how the auction works and what the incentives of the participants are, we may be able to explain why it failed to be relevant. An auction with a different design might have been a more attractive trading option and might have given a more reliable price signal to the private market. This is also relevant for future auctions of tradeable emission permits or other items. Third, we show that market participants may be able to make money in the EPA auctions by using our approach rather than the equilibrium strategy derived by Cason.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the experiences with the EPA auction. In Section 3 we introduce the formal description of the players and the rules of the auction. We also discuss the equilibrium derived by Cason. In this equilibrium sellers only set an asking price. In Section 4 we show that when all other sellers follow Cason's strategy any one seller can achieve a higher payoff by submitting an asking price and a bid price, rather than only an asking price. In Section 5 we discuss the implications for a possible Bayesian Nash equilibrium in our setup. It can be shown that if an equilibrium exists then sellers either submit an asking price equal to 0 plus a positive bid or they only submit a positive asking price and no bid. Section 6 concludes the paper.
THE EPA AUCTION
Because the authorities did not want to rely on the spontaneous development of a private market for sulfur allowances, they decided to set up an annual auction. The auction was to serve as a ''market starter.'' The first auction was held in 1993, whereas the program would start in 1995. The auction was supposed to give an indication of the allowance price to be used as a guideline for private trades. 6 Furthermore, once the program was under way, if electric utilities found it difficult to buy or sell at the private market they could always resort to the auction.
Every year, two types of allowances are auctioned. Allowances from the spot Ž auction can be used immediately or as soon as in 1995 for the 1993 and 1994 . auctions . Allowances from the seven-year advance auction can only be used starting seven years after the auction. From 1993 to 1997 inclusive, there was also an auction of six-year advance allowances. These came from the so-called ''Direct Sales Reserve'' of 25,000 seven-year advance allowances, directly available from the EPA at $1,500. Since this price was far above market prices, no one ever used this 5 Cason also conducted a series of experiments to test whether subjects behave in the way described Ž w x w x. by his model Cason 2 , Cason and Plott 3 . In these experiments sellers did not have the possibility of submitting a bid. 6 In fact, the market-clearing price in the first EPA auctions in 1993 and 1994 was below the average price of the scarce private transactions around that time. From 1995 on, the prices in both markets were Ž w x w x . quite close. See Ellerman et al. 6 or Schmalensee et al. 13 . opportunity, so that the full amount was always auctioned at the next auction. Due to lack of interest in the ''Direct Sales Reserve'' the EPA decided to suspend the facility in 1997 and to offer the 25,000 allowances for sale at the annual seven-year advance auction instead.
As Table I shows, the relative importance of the auction has declined through the years, as has private supply at the auction. In 1993 and 1994, the quantity of private supply was about the same as the quantity offered by the EPA. However, only up to 2% of privately supplied allowances were sold. 7 In 1995, private supply declined drastically, whereas the sales remained at the same level. In 1996, none of the private supply was sold. In 1997 and 1998, there was no private supply at the auction. In 1999 there was some private supply, a minor fraction of which was sold. The year 2000 saw a remarkable increase in the number of privately sold allowances at the auctions. Yet, this number is still negligible compared to the number of privately traded allowances. Thus, the reservation prices for the small number of allowances that were offered at the EPA auction seem to have been too w x high rather than too low, as theory predicts. Joskow et al. 9 suggest that this is 7 Note that the amount offered by the EPA is always sold to the highest bidders. A privately offered allowance is sold only if there is still a bid exceeding its reservation price. Thus we have to subtract the column ''Offered by EPA'' from the column ''Sold'' to obtain the amount of private sales. 
Ž . Despite or perhaps due to the disappointing performance of the auction, a flourishing and efficient private market did develop. We see in Table I that the ratio of privately traded allowances to allowances sold at the auction has risen from 5 to 1 in 1994 to 23 to 1 in 1999. Therefore, Cason's fear 8 seems to have proven unfounded.
THE MODEL
In this section we introduce the formal model to analyze the EPA auction and also present the solution Cason has given for the equilibrium strategies of the sellers. Cason makes the following simplifying assumptions: First, sellers offer only one unit for sale in the auction. Second, the auction is the only way to trade allowances. Third, the units offered by the EPA are not taken into account. Fourth, abstracting from strategic buyers, assume that bids are drawn from some probabil-Ž . w x ity distribution ⌽ и with density whose support is the interval b, b . Fifth, both buyers and sellers are risk neutral.
Suppose we have Q bids. Each of N G Q sellers submits an asking price for selling a single unit. Random bid prices are unknown when sellers enter their asks. Rank the Q bids in decreasing order, b G b G иии G b , and the N asks in Nash equilibrium provided that c is high enough, as is assumed by Cason. When determining her optimal asking price a , the seller must trade off two i effects. On the one hand, a decrease in a results in a higher expected bid price to i which she will be matched and therefore in a higher expected payoff. However, this is only the case when the initial asking price was already low enough for a sale to take place. It can also happen that the initial asking price is too high and there will not be a sale. Then, when the seller reduces her asking price she may succeed in selling her allowance, but will take a loss when the bid price to which she is matched is below her own cost c . For a uniform distribution of bids and sellers' i Ž . costs, Cason shows that the equilibrium ask function has a c -c . Hence, the i i optimal asking price is below the seller's cost c , and there is a possibility that, in i equilibrium, a seller will take a loss. 8 ''If this highly visible market experiment fails because Congress designed the trading mechanism poorly, the negative impact on future regulatory policy may extend well beyond federal acid rain Ž w x . legislation.'' Cason 1, p. 178
IF SELLERS CAN BE BIDDERS
In this section, we prove that the equilibrium described by Cason, in which every seller i sets a strictly positive asking price a , is no longer a Bayesian Nash i equilibrium if we also allow sellers to submit a bid price. Indeed, we will show that, in that case, any situation in which all participating sellers set a strictly positive asking price does not qualify as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In such a situation, every seller can individually improve by submitting an asking price of 0 instead and submitting a positive bid as well. One way to break the equilibrium is the following. We sort all asking prices in ascending order and define r as the rank of some seller i's asking price.
asking price submitted by seller i. We will show that seller i is better off using the alternative strategy described in Theorem 1 rather than using the strictly positive strategy.
Define the marginal bidder m as the bidder with the lowest successful bid, should we have b -c , the highest bid will be her own and the seller effectively 1 i buys her own allowance, thus avoiding a loss. In other cases, the seller is indifferent 9 Since both asking prices and bids are drawn from continuous distributions, there is a probability of 0 that any two are equal. Therefore, we can use strict inequalities instead of weak inequalities. 10 Note that this is only for ease of exposition; seller i does not know the values of the other asking prices and bids. The only thing she possibly knows are the equilibrium strategies which map the valuations of the other participants into asking prices or bids.
between whether or not B is successful, since B is exactly equal to her valuation i i of an allowance. Therefore, using this strategy yields a payoff
To compare the payoffs in 1 and 2 , we have three cases to consider.
1. In case it turns out that both r F m and b -c , using the strictly positive r i strategy yields a negative payoff while the payoff of using the alternative strategy is Ž . Ž . either positive if also b ) c or equal to zero if this is not the case . Thus, in each possible case the seller is at least as well off using the alternative strategy than she is using the strictly positive strategy. Moreover, in the first case she is strictly better off using the alternative strategy. Therefore, for seller i, the alternative strategy strictly dominates the strictly positive strategy, which implies that the latter is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
From Theorem 1 we immediately have w x COROLLARY. The equilibrium described by Cason 1 is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium when sellers can also submit a bid price.
DISCUSSION
In the previous section we showed that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game described by Cason is no longer an equilibrium when we allow for the possibility that sellers can also submit bids. We showed that in that case every seller can improve upon the equilibrium in Cason by submitting an asking price of 0 and a bid equal to her valuation.
Of course, this does not imply that following that strategy constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in our game.
When no other seller sets an asking price equal to 0, then doing so guarantees a match with the highest submitted bid price b . In that case the possibility of a loss 1 can be avoided by simultaneously submitting a bid equal to one's own valuation. When other sellers follow the same strategy, however, then setting an asking price equal to 0 does not guarantee a match with the highest submitted bid price b and 1 the possibility of a loss can no longer be avoided. Suppose that z sellers set asking prices at 0, each of whom is matched at random to one of the z highest bids. Seller i will sustain a loss when her bid B is among the z highest and her asking price is i matched to a bid lower than B . We are not able to find a general solution for this game, even in the simple setup considered here, where both bidders and sellers are interested in only one unit. What we can show is that, should a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exist, any seller Ž x either sets an asking price a s 0 and some bid price B g 0, c , or just sets some
asking price a ) 0 and no bid price. 11 When the valuation c of a given seller is i i high she will be less inclined to set an asking price equal to 0. The higher her valuation c , the higher the probability that the expected value of the z highest i bids is lower than c , with z the number of sellers who decide to set an asking price i equal to 0. Thus, the higher her valuation, the higher the probability that a seller takes a loss from following this strategy. In our game, the optimal strategy of a seller depends on the bid strategies of both bidders and sellers, the equilibrium value of z, and the expected value of the average of the z highest bids. Therefore, we were not able to find an analytical expression for the equilibrium in this game, even when making highly simplifying assumptions.
CONCLUSION w x
Cason 1 argued that the auction which the EPA used to start the market for sulfur allowances can lead to inefficient market outcomes. The setup of the auction gives both buyers and sellers an incentive to understate their valuation of an allowance. Therefore, equilibrium prices are too low, which leads to biased signals and reduces the efficiency of the allowance trading market. In this paper we showed that the incentives in this auction may be even more perverse than Cason suggested. In particular, we showed that sellers have an incentive to set their asking price equal to 0 while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid. We were not able to find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this auction when this possibility is taken into account. What we do know is that if an equilibrium exists sellers either set only a positive asking price, or set an asking price equal to 0 and submit a positive bid as well.
As far as we know, no one has ever simultaneously submitted an asking price and a bid at the EPA auction yet: The EPA does not release the names of those who offer allowances for sale at the auction. However, even if we had this information we would face the problem that many participants use trade names or act through brokers to hide their identity. We also could not find evidence of sellers actually submitting an asking price of 0 in these auctions. Yet we do not believe there is anything in the institutional framework of these auctions that restricts sellers from following our strategy. The strategy we suggest has not been discussed in the literature about the EPA auction. Also, other literature on auctions does not study the possibility. The latter is probably due to the fact that such a strategy is only profitable in a peculiar setup like that of the EPA auction.
We now know that the EPA auction was a failure, in the sense that hardly any private parties sold allowances at the auctions. As a result, it took several years w x before an efficient market in sulfur allowances developed. Cason 1 already predicted difficulties, arguing that equilibrium prices at the auction would be too low, making the market inefficient. Our analysis shows that when sellers can also submit bid prices their incentives in the auction are even more perverse and their optimal strategies even harder to determine, thus shedding even more doubt on the efficiency of such an auction. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that 11 w x For details see Dijkstra and Haan 5 .
